Public Economics and History: A Review of Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy of Premodern States, Edited by Andrew Monson and Walter Scheidel by Hoffman, Philip T.
Journal of Economic Literature 2017, 55(4), 1556–1569
https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20151348
1556
1. Introduction
If public economics today can study all the manifold things modern states do (taxing, 
spending, regulating, intervening to correct 
market failures, implementing macroeco-
nomic policy), its scope of analysis in the past 
might seem severely limited, for by modern 
standards, the range of government action 
was more narrow then than it is today. But 
the public economics of the past still have 
much to tell us about why states rise and 
fall, how they overcome serious problems of 
tax evasion and tax resistance and develop 
the capacity to tax, the effect their policies 
have on financial development and eco-
nomic growth, and—above all else—about 
the political economy behind their policies. 
And it can answer big questions about the 
political economy of premodern states: Why 
did some the states expand and others col-
lapse? Why did per capita tax levels (and to 
a lesser degree, public-goods provision) vary 
greatly across states and over time in the dis-
tant past, even though per capita incomes 
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were roughly the same? And why did finan-
cial markets and representative institutions 
arrive early in the West? The answers are 
not only fascinating intellectually; they may 
shed light on economic growth and political 
development in low-income countries that 
face similar problems of establishing state 
capacity and providing fundamental public 
goods such as security.
Getting to the bottom of those questions, 
though, is not simple; it takes several steps. 
The first is to get the history right for a large 
sample of past states. Only then can one con-
struct economic models, gather systematic 
data, test hypotheses, and ultimately answer 
the big questions about political economy. 
The recent publication of Fiscal Regimes and 
the Political Economy of Premodern States 
(Cambridge University Press), edited by 
Andrew Monson and Walter Scheidel, con-
stitutes a major achievement in completing 
the first step of the process. With nineteen 
meticulous chapters spanning back five mil-
lennia and covering states in East Asia, the 
Middle East, Europe, and  pre-Columbian 
America, the book greatly expands our 
knowledge of premodern fiscal systems and 
political economy. The authors, who come 
from five disciplines (archeology, history, 
economics, political science, and sociology), 
are all experts on the historical fiscal systems 
that they are writing about. They have the 
requisite skills: they are familiar with the 
institutional intricacies of the society they 
are writing about, and almost all of them 
know the languages of the relevant historical 
sources. Readers can therefore be confident 
that their chapters provide a trustworthy 
guide to the history, and with their book in 
print, it is now possible to take the next steps 
toward answering our questions.
 After explaining in detail what the book 
tells us and how it broadens our knowledge, 
this review explores the questions it raises 
about the political economy of  premodern 
states and the tentative answers that it points 
to. The major lesson to draw from the book 
is that we now need systematic data that 
will make possible comparisons across dif-
ferent historical examples. Time series of 
annual government tax receipts or annual 
government expenditures by category will 
be impossible; it is difficult to assemble that 
sort of empirical evidence even for many 
nineteenth-century states. But limited quan-
titative data is feasible, such as periodic esti-
mates of total tax receipts per capita or total 
spending per capita, along with measures 
of what the spending paid for, such as the 
number of soldiers mobilized, kilometers 
of fortifications constructed, or canals dug. 
Qualitative data can be turned into system-
atic econometric evidence too: Do repre-
sentative institutions exist? Does the state 
borrow? Does it provide famine relief or pay 
to construct temples or churches? Obviously 
some of the qualitative or quantitative data 
could come from archeology.
Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy 
of Premodern States also makes it clear that 
we need to construct formal models that can 
be combined with the systematic evidence 
and used to formulate and test hypotheses. 
The starting point for the modeling could be 
a central problem that crops up repeatedly in 
the book: namely, the problem confronting 
a political leader (a king, for instance) who 
makes decisions about taxes or spending—
subject to certain political constraints—in 
order to achieve some goal, such as winning 
a war. Since few of the states described in 
the book were democracies, the political 
constraints usually did not involve winning 
the support of a majority of voters. Rather, 
they turned on gaining the support of piv-
otal members of the elite or avoiding revolts 
or other political costs. The issue, then, is 
whether the state’s fiscal system emerged as 
the solution to the mechanism design prob-
lem facing the political leader or whether it 
was instead shaped primarily by history and 
existing institutions. Getting to the bottom of 
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that issue can lead us to answers for most of 
our questions about the political economy of 
premodern states, but as we shall see, it will 
require not just systematic data and theory, 
but also a deep knowledge of the relevant 
history.
2. Overview of Fiscal Regimes and the 
Political Economy of Premodern States
Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy 
of Premodern States is not the first work on 
the topic. There already exists a literature 
in economic history and political science on 
this subject—a literature that reaches back 
to Schumpeter’s “Crisis of the Tax State” 
(1918) and the pioneering research done 
by the historian Patrick O’Brien (Mathias 
and O’Brien 1976, O’Brien 1988) and the 
historical sociologist Charles Tilly (1990). 
But until recently, most of this literature 
has been limited to case studies of Western 
Europe in the years 1500 to 1800—what his-
torians call the early modern period (O’Brien 
1988; Hoffman and Norberg 1994; Bonney 
1995, 1999; Hoffman and Rosenthal 1997; 
Rosenthal 1998; Ormrod, Bonney, and 
Bonney 1999; Yun-Casalilla and O’Brien 
2012). Those limits made sense because it 
was during that period that most states in 
Western Europe first developed fiscal sys-
tems able to raise substantial amounts of per-
manent tax revenue. The historical records 
for European states in that period were often 
abundant, too. But the focus on early mod-
ern Europe could easily be misleading, and 
it could be downright dangerous for anyone 
who took the European examples as stylized 
facts and then tried to build a model of pre-
modern fiscal systems. One of the virtues of 
Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy of 
Premodern States is that the book makes that 
danger clear.
The reason the examples from early mod-
ern Europe could be misleading is that they 
were unusual on many counts, even by the 
standards of the premodern era. To begin 
with, they imposed very heavy taxes by pre-
modern standards: in 1776, for example, per 
capita taxes (measured in silver) in France 
were 8.7 times what they were in China; in 
England, they were 25.6 times Chinese per 
capita taxes. The results are similar if we 
compare longer periods or different years, 
or measure per capita taxes in man-days of 
unskilled labor (Hoffman 2015b, pp. 50–51; 
Brandt, Ma, and Rawski 2014, table 3). Taxes 
are much lower in the eighteenth-century 
Ottoman Empire, too (Karaman and Pamuk 
2010), and in both China and the Ottoman 
Empire, differences in per capita incomes 
and the frequency of war cannot explain the 
huge gap in per capita tax receipts.
Nor is that the only peculiar feature of 
fiscal regimes in early modern Europe. 
The early modern states spent heavily on 
the military (Dincecco 2011; Hoffman and 
Rosenthal 1997). In Prussia, for example, 
we can separate out annual military expen-
ditures as a fraction of total government 
spending for the period 1688 through 1789; 
for those years, the median figure was 90 per-
cent. In France, the median was 73 percent 
for the years 1600–1688, and much of the 
remaining spending was devoted to interest 
on debts run up in wars (Hoffman 2015a, 
pp. 314–15). By comparison, a similar calcu-
lation for the US federal government for the 
period 1791–1970 yielded a median of only 
43 percent (Carter et al. 2006).
Military spending was high in these early 
modern European states not just because of 
frequent military conflict, but because the 
political leaders who made decisions about 
war and military spending were typically 
kings who had been raised to fight for goals, 
such as glory on the battlefield or victory 
over enemies of the faith, that were impos-
sible to divide up by peaceful bargaining. 
War, for them, was at least in part a con-
sumption good, and because they avoided 
most of the costs of fighting and reaped a 
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 disproportionate share of the benefits, they 
were extremely likely to engage in conflict 
(Hoffman 2015a, 2015b; Jackson and Morelli 
2007).
Apart from defense, these early modern 
European states provided little in the way 
of public goods. They did make available a 
means of exchange—coins—although their 
value was rarely stable. They also provided 
courts to resolve disputes and try crimi-
nals, but these courts were often funded via 
fees imposed on the litigants, and the low-
est jurisdictions often remained in private 
hands. As for transportation infrastructure, 
the early modern European states built 
few roads, canals, or other transportation 
improvements. There were some excep-
tions, but exceptions often involved military 
transport. They did little for water control 
either—that was typically the province of 
local authorities—and often they failed 
even to resolve disputes over property rights 
that kept locally sanctioned water proj-
ects from going forward (Rosenthal 1992). 
They spent almost nothing on education 
and poor relief, either (Lindert 2004), and 
they by and large left the construction of 
churches and religious buildings to private 
donors.
The fiscal systems in early modern Europe 
had one other distinguishing feature. The rul-
ers in many of the states moved from relying 
on revenue from their own personal property 
(their domain, to use historians’ language) to 
taxes imposed on their subjects’ property. 
This shift from what historians would call a 
“domain state” to a “tax state” followed up on 
an even earlier transition in the Middle Ages, 
which saw military leaders turn to income 
from their own domain instead of extract-
ing tribute from conquered territory. There 
is no economic theory behind this pattern 
of a tax state following a domain state and 
an even earlier tribute state, but it seemed 
to fit much of European history (Ormrod, 
Bonney, and Bonney 1999).
The authors of Fiscal Regimes and the 
Political Economy of Premodern States know 
that early modern Europe was unusual. And 
as the introduction to the volume (by the his-
torians of the Greco–Roman world, Andrew 
Monson and Walter Scheidel) makes clear, 
the book’s authors want to break free from 
reliance on early modern European exam-
ples—in particular the pattern of a tran-
sition from tribute to a domain state and 
from there to a tax state. That is one of the 
chief motives behind their effort to extend 
the account of premodern fiscal regimes 
and political economy to other continents 
and further back in time. Although there is 
almost no formal economic theory in the vol-
ume (the one exception is the brief sketch 
of a simple model in the economist Metin 
Cosgel’s excellent chapter on the Ottoman 
Empire), there is, as we shall see, one recur-
rent theme—the principal–agent problem 
facing a political leader who makes decisions 
about taxes or spending in order to achieve 
some goal. In making the decisions, the 
leader has to take into account political con-
straints and the actions of agents who might 
be officials, members of the social or polit-
ical elite, or even—in the rare premodern 
democracies—voters. That theme, in turn, 
may help to explain other patterns that crop 
up in the book: for instance, that per capita 
taxes were often low in large states, because 
they confronted severe agency problems in 
distant provinces and were too big to face 
significant external threats that would have 
justified higher tax rates. 
The first part of the book examines the 
fiscal systems of the Inca Empire, the Aztec 
Empire, and the polities of the ancient Near 
East and Egypt. All were what the editors 
call “extractive” fiscal regimes, in the sense 
that they all relied heavily on taxes paid in the 
form of labor services. In the Inca Empire, 
Terence N. D’Altroy estimates that labor 
duties amounted to 40 percent of the labor 
supply, and besides drawing on labor duties, 
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the state resettled three to five  million  people. 
Politically untrustworthy populations on the 
edge of the empire escaped most of the tax 
burden. The labor services demanded of the 
rest of the population were used not just 
to field armies of over 100,000 men (large 
even by contemporary European standards), 
but to undertake water control projects and 
build roads and agricultural terracing—state 
infrastructure spending of a sort that was 
unknown in early modern Europe.
In the Aztec Empire, distant provinces also 
paid lower taxes. When compared with early 
modern Europe, the Aztec regime mixed 
characteristics of a domain state and a tax 
state. But there was one striking difference 
that set the Aztecs apart from the premodern 
Europeans, according to the author of the 
chapter on the Aztecs, Michael E. Smith: the 
Aztec kings seem not to have used increased 
tax revenues to boost the size of their armies.
Rulers in the ancient Near East and Egypt 
seemed to spend even less on war. Rulers 
there (so historians Michael Jursa and Juan 
Carlos Moreno García claim in their chapter) 
did support the military, but they devoted 
even more of their labor services and tax rev-
enue to religion, redistribution for the elite, 
irrigation, and water control. The spending 
on such public-works projects is yet another 
contrast with premodern Europe. 
The second section of the book comprises 
six chapters on the Roman Republic, the 
Roman Empire, the Hellenistic Empires of 
the ancient Mediterranean, and Imperial 
China from the first dynasty, the Qin (221 BC 
to 206 BC), to the last, the Qing (1644–1912). 
Themes that run throughout these chapters 
include the effects of political fragmentation 
and imperial unification, and the recurrent 
political struggle between central authorities 
and local elites over what share of rent would 
be paid in taxes and what portion would 
remain in the hands of local elites.
In Andrew Monson’s chapter on the 
Hellenistic Empires of the ancient 
Mediterranean, the threat of external ene-
mies drove taxes (mostly on land and often 
farmed out) to high levels. But raising taxes 
could also generate competition with elites 
and even cause empires to collapse. By con-
trast, taxes in the Roman Empire, as Monson 
notes, were usually low, particularly in Italy. 
The reason, he suggests, is that Roman 
emperors enjoyed unmatched military 
supremacy and they could reward local elites 
with fiscal privileges.
The republic that gave rise to the Roman 
Empire was a city-state whose citizens 
enjoyed freedom from taxation. Its decen-
tralized political system, historian James 
Tan argues, discouraged political leaders 
from freely spending public funds, and elites 
feared the rise of a powerful centralized 
state and so kept individuals or factions from 
gaining control of the treasury. Although the 
Roman Republic did borrow, it had little tax 
infrastructure, and much tax collection was 
farmed out.
Two chapters by Walter Scheidel and Gilles 
Bransbourg examine what happens when the 
Roman Republic became an empire. The 
first step was a military dictatorship with a 
large standing army, a small bureaucracy, 
and the cooperation of the elite. Initially, the 
lack of serious external threats meant that 
taxes were generally low, and the populace 
in Rome itself were placated with the free 
distribution of grain. After the second cen-
tury, pressure from foreign enemies led to 
tax increases, and even before then, there 
was a shift away from reliance on tax farming 
and toward levies-based censuses conducted 
by city governments and Roman officials. By 
the late Roman Empire, as citizenship was 
granted to provincial elites and soldiers, it 
became increasingly difficult politically to 
justify a tributary fiscal regime that imposed 
the heaviest tax burden on the provinces. 
Uniform taxes collected by a bureaucracy 
were established by the end of the third 
century, despite conflict with provincial 
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elites who had assessed and allocated local 
taxes. Universal taxation saved the empire, 
except in Western Europe, which fell prey 
to invaders.
The two chapters on imperial China, by the 
historians Mark Lewis and Kent Deng, show 
that per capita taxes in the Chinese Empire 
were almost always low. That was the pattern 
set when the first dynasty to unify China—
the Qin—rapidly collapsed after imposing 
heavy taxes. There were other reasons for 
the low taxes as well, besides fear of the sort 
of political instability and popular revolt that 
brought about the quick demise of the Qin. 
The dynasties that ruled the empire faced few 
peer states in East Asia and so did not have to 
raise taxes to fight powerful external enemies, 
and low taxes fit Confucian ideals of benevo-
lent rule. The Chinese emperors also feared 
that high taxes would allow local officials to 
siphon off more of the government’s reve-
nue, because in a large empire it was hard to 
monitor local tax collection and local govern-
ment spending. Here, the argument echoes 
similar claims made by economic historians 
Tuan-Hwee Sng and Chiaki Moriguchi 
(Sng 2014; Sng and Moriguchi 2014), who 
maintain that the difficulties of monitoring 
officials in a large empire like China allowed 
officials to exploit taxpayers. To limit the 
exploitation and prevent revolts, the Chinese 
emperors therefore kept taxes low.
In the history of imperial China, there 
were two major exceptions to the pattern 
of low taxes: the Song Dynasty (960–1279) 
and the Qing Dynasty after roughly 1850. 
To explain the higher taxes under the Song, 
Kent Deng points to external military threats 
and growing domestic trade. Recent work by 
Guanglin Liu (Liu 2015a, 2015b) points in 
the same direction and also argues that living 
standards were rising in Song China. But the 
progress was all snuffed out by the Mongol 
invasion and the two subsequent dynas-
ties, the Yuan (1271–1368) and the Ming 
(1368–1644).
In the second period of high taxes, the late 
Qing Dynasty, China faced foreign threats 
and empire-wide social unrest, which devas-
tated the imperial financial system. To make 
war on the rebels, Qing officials took two 
steps that were unprecedented in Chinese 
history: they imposed heavy new indirect 
taxes on commerce and they borrowed 
money abroad. But the central government 
lost control of most provinces, which fell 
into the hands of local military commanders, 
leaving late Qing China heading for what 
Deng suggests was either de facto federalism 
or “downright feudalism.”
The third section of the book examines 
divergent trends among established fiscal 
regimes in the Middle East, Europe, and 
Japan. Historian John Haldon’s chapter 
traces what happened to the fiscal system as 
the Roman Empire disintegrated in Western 
Europe, but survived as the Byzantine 
Empire in the eastern Mediterranean. In 
what became medieval Western Europe, 
tax collection withered away. State income 
and bureaucracy disappeared, and all that 
was left were the king’s domain and grants 
of land and powers to mighty local elites. 
The Byzantine Empire, by contrast, pre-
served both the Roman bureaucracy and 
the Roman Empire’s land taxes. With the 
resulting revenue devoted to war, the 
Byzantine Empire expanded for a while. 
But Muslim forces halted its expansion and 
forced the empire to shrink, and although 
the empire began to tax commerce too, 
western crusaders sacked Constantinople in 
1204 and put an end to its military preem-
inence. The empire was finally conquered 
by the Ottomans in 1453.
The early Islamic state also preserved 
Roman taxation. The reason, as historian 
Hugh Kennedy explains, was not because of 
any sentimental attachment to the Roman 
model, nor because there was a bureaucracy 
that the Muslims continued to use out of 
institutional inertia. Rather, it was because 
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the land-tax setup worked, although it came 
to an end in the tenth century.
Metin Cosgel’s chapter on the Ottoman 
Empire outlines a simple economic model to 
explain Ottoman taxation. Beginning in the 
fourteenth century, the empire expanded 
greatly in the Middle East, the Balkans, and 
around the Mediterranean, and as it grew, 
the Ottoman emperors confronted new 
political constraints and new collection and 
monitoring costs in the territory they added. 
Cosgel’s model takes up the emperor’s prob-
lem and seeks to explain why tax levels var-
ied from place to place and why what was 
taxed varied greatly from activity to activity. 
Collection and monitoring costs turn out to 
be the explanation in what was taxed; taxes 
focused on activities that were easily observ-
able. For similar reasons, tax revenues were 
often assigned to local governments because 
that reduced the cost of transporting money. 
As for the political constraints the emperor 
confronted, they are the reason existing fiscal 
structures were often left in place—namely, 
to avoid rebellions. They were also the motive 
for choosing local leaders to be tax collectors. 
Doing so rewarded these local leaders with 
a share of tax revenue, but the policy was 
appealing because it put their comparative 
advantage as local leaders to work in estab-
lishing the legitimacy of Ottoman rule.
Historian Philip Brown covers state build-
ing and the development of the fiscal system 
in early modern Japan. Early steps toward 
a centralized state in medieval Japan were 
reversed, and in the sixteenth century, the 
country fell in to civil war between regional 
leaders. By the end of the century, three of 
the leaders unified Japan under what, in the 
seventeenth century, became the rule of 
the Tokugawa Shoguns. But the rule of the 
Shoguns, which lasted into the nineteenth 
century, was not centralized. Akin to a fed-
eral state, it left enormous powers to local 
overlords, the daimyo. Although the Shogun 
controlled foreign policy and could keep the 
daimyo from challenging him or fighting 
one another, tax revenues remained in the 
hands of the daimyo, who bargained over 
what would be taxed and how taxes would be 
collected. There was no centralization of the 
fiscal system and no government borrowing 
or formal government budgets, either.
The fourth section of the book takes up the 
fiscal systems of classical Athens, the other 
classical Greek city-states, and medieval 
city-states and Europe. All were innovative. 
Although the ancient Greek city-states spent 
a significant fraction of public revenue on 
the military, historian Emily Mackil argues 
that war was, nonetheless, not the major 
driver of their fiscal and political develop-
ment, in contrast to what happened in early 
modern Europe. Taxes funded a variety of 
public goods and services—not just defense: 
in Delphi and Teos, for instance, the salary 
of a public doctor; on the islands of Samos 
or Delos, grain to be distributed to citizens. 
Greek city-states borrowed, and not only 
to pay for wars; the provision of grain also 
caused the city-states to incur debt. And 
there is yet another contrast to early mod-
ern Europe, where most states were run by 
autocratic kings and princes, decisions about 
taxation were reached via negotiation with 
citizens.
The same was true of Athens, the big-
gest ancient Greek city-state, as the politi-
cal scientist Josiah Ober demonstrates in his 
chapter. Athens was an unusually egalitarian 
democracy, at least for the free, native, male 
citizens who made up about 12 percent of 
the population. In contrast to early modern 
Europe, where the wealthy often escaped 
taxation, the rich in Athens did pay taxes, 
which went not just for national defense, 
but to sustain the state religion and keep the 
government running, too. Poorer citizens 
did not owe the major direct taxes, and the 
government would pay them for serving in 
the military, attending religious festivals, and 
doing government work.
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Like their counterparts in ancient Greece, 
city-states in medieval Europe were also 
able to borrow, as political scientist David 
Stasavage shows in his chapter, and the loans 
they floated (so he argues) gave rise to mod-
ern public debt. The reason the medieval 
city-states could and did borrow was simple. 
They had reason to borrow because their 
expenditures often soared, typically when 
they were fighting wars. They collected taxes 
not in kind, but in money that could be used 
to repay creditors. And they had representa-
tive institutions that were run by merchants 
who had, themselves, purchased govern-
ment debt and so would work to ensure that 
tax revenue would go to repay the city-state’s 
loans. With the representative institutions 
reassuring lenders that they would be repaid, 
the medieval city-states were able to float 
loans.
The final two chapters of the book are 
comparative. In a chapter on large empires, 
the historian Peter Bang notes that these 
empires usually imposed low per capita 
taxes. That was true, for example, in the 
Roman Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and 
imperial China. These empires also faced a 
common problem. They typically had small, 
centrally controlled administrations and they 
therefore had to depend on help from local 
elites, who had to be rewarded for their assis-
tance. The problem was how to prevent the 
elites from siphoning off so many resources 
that they would become rivals to the central 
authority. One way to keep the elites from 
growing too powerful was limit their access 
to military power and to revenue from agri-
culture, which in large premodern empires 
was usually the largest sector of the economy.
Finally, the sociologist Edgar Kiser and 
the political scientist Margaret Levi (both 
well-known for prior work on the political 
economy of premodern states, including 
Levi 1988, Kiser and Kane 2001, and Kiser 
and Cai 2003) evaluate what emerges from 
all these case studies and what topics deserve 
more research. They, too, note that taxes 
appear to be low in large empires, and call 
for a more precise baseline against which the 
level of taxes can be judged. They also call 
for more study of expenditures. Unlike the 
states in early modern Europe, premodern 
states elsewhere sometimes spent tax reve-
nue on things other than war. The patterns of 
spending deserve study, as do the alternative 
ways to pay for the goods and the services 
that premodern states provided—not just by 
expending tax revenue, but by borrowing, 
collecting tribute from conquests, or draw-
ing income from a ruler’s domain. Kiser and 
Levi also call for attention to the negotiation 
involved in premodern fiscal systems, even 
when they were autocracies. Taxpayers could 
migrate or hide income if taxes were too 
heavy, and tax collectors often had enough 
power to pocket tax revenue. Governments 
had to get both the taxpayers and the tax 
collectors to cooperate, and Kiser and Levi 
argue that winning the quasi-voluntary 
compliance of the taxpayers was often crit-
ical. The quasi-voluntary compliance, they 
maintain, depended on having the govern-
ment avoid corruption and deliver the public 
goods that promised in return for taxes. If 
the government failed to do that, tax reve-
nues could shrivel up.
3. Questions Raised by the Book
Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy 
of Premodern States raises a number of 
important questions. It takes the first step 
toward answering them, but there is much 
more research to do, on both government 
expenditures and taxation. 
For expenditures, the key question that 
the book poses is why some premodern 
states spent tax revenue on things other than 
war. Defense is an essential public good, 
and war spending dominated the budgets 
of many of the premodern states surveyed 
in Fiscal Regimes and the Political Economy 
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of Premodern States. But some states (impe-
rial China, the Inca Empire, states in the 
ancient Near East, and the city-states of 
ancient Greece) devoted funds to infrastruc-
ture, religion, or famine relief, and another 
(the Aztec Empire) refrained from raising 
taxes to increase the size of the army. If 
military expenditures were high, the cause 
was likely either the existence of major for-
eign threats (which might be minimal for 
large hegemonic empires that intimidated 
their neighbors) or the incentives created 
by a political system in which leaders (such 
as the kings of early modern Europe) could 
go to war without bearing the full costs of 
the fighting. The rarity of famine relief out-
side of republican city-states can be traced 
back to autocratic government that limited 
political voice (Lindert 2004). But how do 
we account for those premodern states that 
did spend on infrastructure and religion, 
and for autocratic regimes such as imperial 
China (Will and Wong 1991) that did provide 
famine relief? And if states did not pay for 
infrastructure, religious expenses, or relief 
in times of dearth, did local governments? 
Or were those tasks left to private entre-
preneurs, pious donors, or generous mem-
bers of one’s own family via a process that 
was shaped by history (as has happened in 
modern times in Latin America, according to 
Arroyo, Abad, and Lindert 2017)?  
With taxation, the first question is how tax 
systems arose in the first place. Getting peo-
ple to pay taxes means overcoming a free-
rider problem, and although a ruler with an 
army can compel them to fork money over, 
that is not easy without some initial revenue 
to mobilize the army. Warlords with armed 
followers who live off of plunder have an 
advantage here, but even they have to con-
tend with tax evasion or migration by poten-
tial taxpayers, as contemporary evidence 
from Africa shows (Sánchez de la Sierra 
2013). The problem is not only historical. It 
arises in development economics, because 
many poor countries lack the capacity to col-
lect much tax revenue and so cannot provide 
essential public goods such as security or pub-
lic health (Bates 2001; Besley and Persson 
2009, 2010). Historically, compulsion played 
a role, but so did leaders who could convince 
people that taxes would, in fact, be used to 
furnish essentials such as security or a sta-
ble means of exchange. The historical evi-
dence here in fact fits the evidence from 
public-goods experiments, where outcomes 
depend on the recent history of play and can 
change if participants become convinced 
that others will contribute (Hoffman 2015a, 
2015b; Arifovic and Ledyard 2012). It also 
exemplifies the sort of negotiation that Kiser 
and Levi discuss in their chapter.
In polities that did manage to impose tax-
ation, what dictated the design of their fiscal 
systems? What was the political economy 
behind the government’s taxation and spend-
ing? Establishing taxation in premodern 
states often involved putting together a coali-
tion of elites who benefited from a particular 
tax regime, but since redistributive coalitions 
are often unstable, what held the coalitions 
together? What made the rest of the popu-
lation cooperate? Compulsion, a belief that 
the fiscal system was legitimate, or the sim-
ple fact the state provided enough essential 
public goods to keep taxpayers from migrat-
ing or rebelling? And was the fiscal system 
an accident of history and existing social and 
political institutions? Or was it created by a 
political leader who was pursuing an objec-
tive (for instance, raising money to win a 
war) in the face of political constraints and 
a lack of information about the behavior of 
elites and taxpayers?
That is, at bottom, a mechanism-design 
problem, and the question then is whether 
either a careful analysis of the history or an 
application of mechanism design or other 
economic theory (or perhaps the use of 
history and economic theory combined, as 
in Rosenthal 1998) can make sense of the 
1565Hoffman: Public Economics and History
 political economy of premodern fiscal sys-
tems and explain why tax rates varied across 
time and across states. The variation in tax 
revenues and government spending (partic-
ularly military expenditures) should, in turn, 
shed light on the rise and fall of states and 
their expansion and contraction. Heavy taxes 
(including conscripted military labor ser-
vices) provoked revolts, but they also allowed 
a state to defend itself and defeat and swal-
low up military competitors (Levine and 
Modica 2013). In the eighteenth century, 
when Britain was only beginning to industri-
alize, it collected far more tax revenue per 
capita than China or France, and its taxes 
were a higher share of national income, too. 
Britain’s huge tax revenues, in turn, go a long 
way to explaining why the British defeated 
Napoleon and why the British Empire 
expanded around the world.
Although limited political voice blocked 
redistribution in most premodern autocra-
cies, there are instances of autocracies dis-
tributing resources to the populace. The 
Inca Empire provided the general popula-
tion with coca and capsicum peppers, and 
in Rome, the Emperor doled out subsidized 
food. How do we explain the instances where 
autocracies did redistribute? And were taxes 
ever progressive?  
Readers of Fiscal Regimes and the 
Political Economy of Premodern States will 
also wonder about how premodern fiscal sys-
tems affected economic growth and financial 
development. Sustained economic growth 
was out of the question, for all of the polit-
ical regimes surveyed in book preceded the 
Industrial Revolution except for the late 
Qing Dynasty in China. But the fiscal systems 
could have raised or lowered the level of per 
capita income, as in a simple Solow model 
without technical change. The political econ-
omy of the fiscal systems could have also pro-
moted the development of financial markets. 
Because the rare instances of premodern 
states with  government debt (city-states in 
ancient Greece and medieval Europe) all 
involve representative institutions, it might 
seem that government borrowing required 
some kind of republican government. But 
that is clearly not the case, as the example of 
absolutist early modern France demonstrates 
(Hoffman,  Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal 
2000). Yet as David Stasavage argues in his 
chapter, the representative institutions may 
have facilitated the growth of government 
debt, particularly if the delegates in the insti-
tutions bought the debt themselves.
4 The Need for Systematic Data
The questions that Fiscal Regimes and 
the Political Economy of Premodern States 
raises make it clear that we now need sys-
tematic data on taxation and government 
spending in premodern states. That sort of 
data is essential if we want to make compar-
isons across historical examples and reach a 
deeper understanding of the political econ-
omy of premodern states. The case studies 
in the book and in the bibliographies of each 
chapter give us detailed histories of premod-
ern fiscal systems, which are an essential first 
step. The book also points to some common 
features of the premodern fiscal systems, and 
some striking differences, too. But if we want 
to get a deeper understanding of the under-
lying political economy, we need systematic 
data.
Without such data, it is, in fact, difficult 
even to begin assessing some of the most 
interesting claims in the book—for example, 
the claim that large empires kept per capita 
taxes low. Testing that claim obviously neces-
sitates systematic comparisons across states, 
as Levi and Kiser point out, and so far the 
only systematic comparison we have involves 
early modern China and two European 
states. The ideal would be the sort of panel 
data set (with all the figures in comparable 
units) that Mark Dincecco has assembled for 
Europe for the years 1650–1913 (Dincecco 
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2009, 2011) and put online at the Global 
Price and Income History website (gpih.
ucdavis.edu). But we also need comparisons 
with incomes. Were per capita taxes low, for 
instance, relative to per capita income?
So what sort of systematic data would it 
be possible to collect? Although time series 
of annual tax receipts or government expen-
ditures by category are out of the question, 
it should be possible to put together limited 
quantitative data, such as periodic estimates 
of total tax receipts per capita or total gov-
ernment spending per capita (in gold, sil-
ver, man-hours of labor, or kilograms of a 
major commodity such as grain), along with 
measures of what the spending paid for, 
such as the number of soldiers mobilized 
or kilometers of fortifications constructed 
or canals dug per year or century, much of 
which could be taken from archeological 
evidence. Conceivably, the per capita tax 
and spending figures could then be com-
bined with daily wages, if they are available, 
or with estimates of per capita GDP or per 
capita food consumption. Estimates for 
GDP per capita are now being pushed back 
to the Middle Ages in parts of Europe and 
China (Broadberry et al. 2015; Broadberry, 
Guan, and Li 2017; van Zanden, Luiten, 
and van Leeuwen 2012), so the goal here is 
not impossible; in fact, Fiscal Regimes and 
the Political Economy of Premodern States 
already contains estimates of taxes as a frac-
tion of GDP in the early Roman Empire 
and government expenditures as a fraction 
of GDP in ancient Rome. Similarly, counts 
of soldiers could be compared to population 
estimates in order to determine what frac-
tion of the populace the army mobilized. It 
might be possible to make similar estimates 
of the fraction of the labor force that was 
channeled into the government building 
projects, whether they involved construc-
tion of forts, canals, or roads. There would 
obviously be huge gaps in all this data, but 
it might still be feasible to carry out this sort 
of  systematic  estimation once a century for 
individual states, in the way that Ian Morris 
has done for other evidence from ancient 
civilizations (Morris 2010, 2013).
Qualitative data could be turned into sys-
tematic econometric evidence, too:  Do rep-
resentative institutions exist? Does the state 
borrow and if so, only for war? Does it pro-
vide famine relief or pay to construct infra-
structure or churches? Again, some of the 
answers could come from archeology. When 
assembled in a systematic way (again with 
what might be only one observation every 
century for a particular state), this sort of 
data could be used to determine when rep-
resentative institutions or public debt arise.
5.  Formal Models 
Getting a deeper understanding of the 
political economy of premodern states will 
also require formal models. It is clear (par-
ticularly from the discussion in the chapters 
by Cosgel and by Kiser and Levi) that the 
politics in Fiscal Regimes and the Political 
Economy of Premodern States revolves 
around a principal–agent problem, in which 
a political leader who makes decisions about 
taxes or spending in order to achieve some 
goal while taking into account political con-
straints and the actions of agents, who might 
be officials, members of the social or political 
elite, subjects, or even voters. The leader may 
know some things about the agents, but not 
everything—for instance, whether the offi-
cials exploit taxpayers. The question then is 
whether mechanism design can make sense 
of premodern fiscal systems. Since the lead-
ers often made decisions about war, it would 
also be worthwhile applying models of con-
flict (Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2007). Such 
models already make it clear why premod-
ern leaders who avoided the costs of fight-
ing were so likely to go to war (Jackson and 
Morelli 2007), and they could also be utilized 
to analyze political change (Hoffman 2015b). 
1567Hoffman: Public Economics and History
Some of the political economy of the 
premodern states, of course, can easily 
be understood without any sort of formal 
model. It is clear, for example, why the 
Inca Empire did not impose labor duties on 
untrustworthy coastal populations and why 
the Aztec Empire did not levy taxes in dis-
tant provinces. The populations in the dis-
tant and coastal districts had an exit option: 
they might more easily rebel or move away. 
In addition, the collection costs would be too 
high. Similar causes kept net taxes low for 
local elites living near the frontiers of early 
modern France. They could bargain for 
lower taxes or a share of any tax increase, and 
as a result, the central government—even 
under an absolutist king—would collect less.
But other questions about the political 
economy of the premodern states would 
benefit from having a formal model. Two 
such questions immediately come to mind. 
The first concerns how taxes are collected—
whether that is the job of officials or whether 
tax collection is privatized and left to tax 
farmers, who can also lend the government 
money with the loans secured by the taxes 
they collect. Officials appear late in the early 
modern period Europe, but they date back 
centuries in China. Service as officials in the 
Chinese Empire provided local elites with 
rewards and loosened their ties to local soci-
ety. That had huge consequences, because 
it helped keep the Chinese Empire intact 
even when it was invaded, in contrast to the 
Roman Empire, where local elites did not 
depend on government service for rewards 
(Burbank and Cooper 2010, pp. 54–9).
A formal model of when taxes are farmed 
out and when bureaucracies of officials are 
created would therefore be important. A 
simple principal–agent model with an agent 
who bids on collecting taxes might be a place 
to start. It might suggest that as the govern-
ment grew in size, the agent would hesitate 
to bid if the profits from collecting taxes were 
correlated with the returns on the agent’s 
other assets. The government could break 
the task of tax collection into pieces, but at 
some point, economies of scale in supervision 
might make it better for the government to 
hire multiple agents and pay them a salary—
in other words, create a bureaucracy of offi-
cials. Recruitment of the officials could also 
bring political benefits, as in China. A formal 
model of the whole process—and how it was 
affected by exogenous variables such as the 
size of the country—would, in turn, allow one 
to explain when taxes are farmed and when 
revenue bureaucracies are created.
Another way to formulate the same prob-
lem would be to consider a government that 
is selling private entrepreneurs the rights to 
collect large or small amounts of tax reve-
nue. Although the entrepreneurs know what 
the taxes are worth, government does not, 
because it lacks a fiscal bureaucracy. But the 
government can vary the amount of tax rights 
that it sells (for instance, rights to a sales tax in 
large or small number of cities) and the price 
that it charges for the tax rights. If we make 
some simplifying assumptions about this 
mechanism-design problem, the government 
will do best by offering an advantageous deal 
to entrepreneurs who collect a large amount 
of taxes and squeezing those who collect small 
amounts of taxes until they are indifferent 
between collecting taxes and doing something 
else. The implication is that if governments 
farmed taxes, we should see them selling off 
some large packages of tax rights. Whether 
they do that, however, will also depend on the 
political power of tax farmers and whether 
they can accumulate enough capital to take 
on a large tax farm. Entrepreneurs in early 
modern France, for instance, were able to 
take on large tax farms, but they had serious 
trouble doing the same thing in the Ottoman 
Empire. That may have helped the French 
win wars but it also contributed to the French 
Revolution (Balla and Johnson 2009). 
The second question that deserves to be 
analyzed with a formal model is explaining 
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why per capita taxes were low in large states 
such as imperial China, the eighteenth century 
Ottoman Empire, or the Roman Republic. 
The first step here is gathering the system-
atic data needed to verify that per capita taxes 
actually were lower in large states and to mea-
sure accurately how much lower they were, 
particularly relative to per capita income. But 
the next step would be using a model to ana-
lyze the relationship between state size and 
tax levels. The starting point might be the 
mechanism-design problem with the leader 
who seeks tax revenue—for example, because 
he is considering whether to go to war. The 
leader has to consider whether taxpayers will 
rebel, and they might be more likely to revolt 
in distant provinces. But the leader also has to 
take into account the behavior of agents, such 
as tax collectors or elites entrusted with gath-
ering local taxes. Both might exploit taxpayers 
(particularly in distant provinces) by forcing 
them to hand over bribes, and if the exploita-
tion was added to heavy taxes, it could raise 
the risk of rebellion even higher. The result 
would be a model similar to the one that Sng 
and Moriguchi use to explain low tax levels in 
China (Sng 2014; Sng and Moriguchi 2014), 
although it would have to be extended to add 
decisions about war.
The issue is whether such a model could 
be generalized beyond China. It would take 
state size as given and then presumably pre-
dict that tax levels would always be lower in 
larger states. But it would leave open the 
question of how to explain state size (Alesina 
and Spolaore 2003).
The alternative would be to seek histor-
ical explanations both for state size and tax 
levels. A large state like the Chinese Empire 
or the early Roman Empire would create a 
hegemon that would discourage neighbors 
from attacking. Such a state might be able to 
avoid imposing heavy taxes to fight wars, par-
ticularly if it drained tribute from recently 
conquered territory, as the Roman Republic 
and early Roman Empire did. But perhaps 
the most promising path to a deeper under-
standing, though, would be to combine the 
history, the systematic data, and the formal 
models. That is likely the best path toward a 
deeper understanding of the political econ-
omy of premodern states.
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